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THE UPANISHADIC CONCEPTION OF MIND
BY KURT F. LEIDECKER
WHAT the Hindus understand by mind is so different from
our conceptions no matter from what philosophical camp
they may come that it is well to abandon the method of investigat-
ing comparatively the Eastern and Western ideas. Hindu thought
cannot be explained on the basis of a parallelism because it rests
on presuppositions totally different from ours. Thus far no ex-
position of the typical Hindu conception of mind has done full jus-
tice to the niceties embodied in the latter. Moreover, what pecu-
liar conception there is now current in Indian thinking is firmly
rooted in the past and all philosophical reflection is ultimately
grounded in the A'eda, especially that portion of it called the Upan-
ishads, the earliest of which were composed about 600 B. C.
The Sanskrit terminus tcchnicus for mind is manas which i.b
etymologically identical with Latin mens and our English equiva-
lent. The term is met with already in the pre-Upanishadic litera-
ture. The sections, however, in which it occurs yield with our
present methods of interpretation little that is of interest philo-
sophically unless it be the idea that cosmic phenomena are akin to
what passes in the human being. Most instructive, and revealing
the introspective observations of the Hindus at their best, are tht
similes in the Upanishads in which the mind figures. These similes
are most artistic, imaginary and original while happy and pertinent
at the samp time. The interdependence of mind, for instance, with
life ipraua) is illustrated by a bird tied to a string. He flutters in
every direction, but, not finding a foothold, he has to settle down
on his fastening. Explaining the origin of mind out of the finest
essence of "food' it is likened to the butter which moves upward in
the process of churning.
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However, these similes do not as yet convey the precise meaning
and significance of the Hindu conception. There is a classical con-
ception in the Katha Upanishad which is copied with modifications
or alluded to in later literature, including the Buddhist literature.
There mind is compared to the reins checking the unbridled horses
which are the indriyas or the powers that reside behind the sense
faculties. Elsewhere, mind is the charioteer of the body, it is a mes-
senger, and again a cart.
All this imagery if not really, at least by suggestion points to a
physical explanation of mind. But at the bottom of it we find con-
cealed behind a psycho-physical a logical point of view which em-
phasizes the functional element throughout. Mind is essentially that
which functions in conjunction with the faculty and material of
creative imagination, will and sensory experience. In fact, to the
Hindu, mind has no other significance.
The characteristics of mind viewed phenomenally are by no
means exhausted by the above-quoted similes. A moderate degree of
agility and animation, however, could be inferred. The mind is a
'procurer' (avarodhinl) , it acts vigorously in dream as well as in
waking. It is hard to manage, is restless, wandering astray, im-
petuous, strong, stifif, and as difficult to get under control as the wind.
By way of interpretation we may say that mind as a purely con-
templative function has no meaning in this Eastern view. The
character of meditating and musing which we are prone to ascribe
to the Hindu temper is but a special function of mind, if we are to
believe the Upanishadic records. Mind is of the active, impulsive,
and volitional in the same measure as it is or makes for mental calm-
ness.
This bifurcation of mind must be considered at length. Ac-
cording to the domination and preponderance of one element at
the expense of the other, mind is called 'pure' or 'impure'. Who-
ever is familiar with Hindu ideas is able to judge at once what is
meant by these predications, without knowing the passage. What-
ever is dissociated from passion, rashness, and desire is^^considered
good and praiseworthy. Consequently, that quality which changes
the mind into a vehement and aggressive element is desire, kama, in
Sanskrit. Not that the mind is conditioned by desire. Acting spon-
taneously the mind releases or creates desire. Similarly, the mani-
festations of human nature which seem to be motivated by desire,
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doubt, fear, sensory enjoyment, and the like, are really actuated
by the mind. One passage, in fact, identifies all these.
Hence, it is not only the opinion of various commentators that
the mind in its volitional and restless aspect is responsible for the
round of rebirth. One Upanishad expressly designates the mind as
the root of the tree of saiiisara.
Actuation of will, then, is the work of mind, according to the
Upanishadic conception. But the mind exhibits its tendency to
vivacity and mobility in still another way. The control of the m-
driyas, the powers underlying the faculties of our senses, falls to
the lot of mind also. The mind, therefore, incurs the responsibility
—although in an indirect fashion—for our sensuous experience.,
be it of a vehement or temperate type.
These powers, as we shall call them briefly, stand at the fron-
tier of the subjective and objective, so to say. They are not, as
is commonly supposed, the sense-organs. At any rate, they are
spoken of as either unrestrained steeds or well-trained and will-
ing horses. The wise and virtuous will control the urges residing
behind the various senses by means of the mind. Perfect self-re-
straint, as far as sensuous experience goes, is the ideal of Stoics
and Sariinyasins alike.
Yet a well-checked sense activity is not all that the Hindu re-
quires for perfection. Because the mind possesses self-motion, it
requires steadiness no less. Subjugation of the action of the sen-
sory powers must be followed by an aversion of the mind frotii
the objects, in the sense of aims (artha), which are conjoined with
each particular organ. Otherwise conduct is false and deceitful, as
the Bhagavad Gita says—by the way, a fine ethical distinction of
the Hindus who are generally reputed to be indififerent in matters of
morality.
Thus far we have considered the mind in its more or less 'im-
pure' form. As such it appears as a psycho-physical complex whose
activity and influence extend over the various functions of the
sensuous organism as well as over the exertions of will and de-
sire. It is reckoned throughout as 'more than', or 'higher than'
the sense powers. This is not only because the mind is subtler and
less material than they ; but mainly for the reason that it mediates
the knowledge and understanding of the self or atman. This is
in part accomplished by the thoughts (dhiyah).
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The Kaiishitaki Upanishad conveys the impression that thoughts
are existential elements (bhiita). They retain a kind of mobility,
yet they may be steadied and fixed. Desire is only very indirect-
ly associated with thought and thinking in general. The presump-
tion seems to be throughout that thought itself is able to produce
a certain efifect, or, rather, be it. This involves, of course, the whole
theory of tapas, iiiedha, and yoga which cannot be dealt with here.
We can say only that in this view the thing desired achieves reality
in employing one's thought about it. However, thought as such
tends towards the opposite of will which makes for motion and un-
rest. In the conception of dhyana thinking has reached quiescence
and stability.
In order to reconstruct for ourselves the Upanishadic conception
of mind and to present a summary picture we may say that in the
concept iiianas the intellectual and the volitional are combined.
Although it is not described as such, the various statements made
concerning it presuppose a certain set of ideas and associations
which make possible these sketches, characterizations, and allusions
upon which posterity relies in the restoration of the ancient mina.
Mind serves the duty of the wishing, willing, and thinking agency
with a proper balance between them. The wise man is he who ob-
serves an equilibrium throughout, who remains the same (sania),
not following his whims and passions, nor dreaming and reposing
in a state of dolce far iiicnte. Harmony is better than excess in
either direction ; even though the Hindu mind has a bent towards
quiescence, this is the final solution of India's most revered book,
the Bhagavad Gita.
In point of relationship mind may be considered to have an
objective and a subjective aspect. The two coincide in Hindu thought
with the active and passive principles respectively. The logical re-
lation of objectivity and subjectivity is, perhaps, more instructive
than the psychological antithesis.
The iiidnyas, as faculties of sensation, mediate an external
world through the various sense organs. Thoughts (dhiyah) have
to be present in order to change these sensations into perceptions.
This is our Western interpretation of the checking of the indriyas.
Perceptions or ideas are the stable elements of mind according to
this theory, while sensations are continuously fluctuating. Later
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speculations, however, concern themselves not so much with these
two but with citta which has a significance of its own.
The normally functioning mind has thus a double reference in
wishing and thinking. These two must be properly balanced; if
not, mind lacks the objective reference, the character of mediating
and exchanging subjective and objective elements and its activity
will not have objective validity. In fact, this special function of the
mind (maiias) is "to believe', "to opine', 'to hold', and the like (man).
The mind confined to itself may thus entertain opinions which may
be well or ill founded, or it may engender guesses of the nature of
a conjecture, hypothesis, or imagination for want of a precise and
ascertainable idea or fact.
